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Aid Beneficiaries
In 1980, the Supreme Court held for the first time that 42 U.S.C. §
19831 provides a cause of action for deprivations of federal statutory
rights.' Because the Court had previously held only that section 1983 em-
braced constitutional claims,' this holding appeared to expand dramati-
cally the scope of section 1983. In particular, it appeared that section 1983
might provide a universal private right of action for enforcing the condi-
tions imposed upon states by federal grant-in-aid programs 4-a right of
action that courts had granted only sporadically before.
Two subsequent decisions, however, suggest that section 1983 may ex-
tend less broadly. In these decisions, the Court precluded section 1983
claims when the underlying statute does not confer substantive rights5 and
when it provides an exclusive remedy for their violation.' The Court has
also suggested that some individual interests in state compliance with a
grant condition may be insufficient to make that condition a "right se-
cured" under section 1983.7 Although the scope of these qualifications re-
mains largely uncertain, they severely threaten the usefulness of section
1983 in enforcing grant conditions.
This Note argues that section 1983 should be available as a mechanism
for ensuring that states administer grant programs in conformity with fed-
eral requirements. In many cases, alternative means of enforcing grant
conditions are inadequate to protect either the rights of grant beneficiaries
or the interests of the federal government in state compliance. Because the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
3. Although the Court had suggested in dictum that § 1983 might embrace statutory claims,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974), and had decided statutory claims brought pendent to
constitutional claims under § 1983, see infra p. 1004, it had never decided whether suits challenging
state action because of its inconsistency with federal statutory law could be brought under § 1983.
4. Claims alleging the violation of federal grant conditions by state officials fulfill the elements of
a § 1983 claim. These are that plaintiffs have "been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution
and the laws' of the United States," and that the defendant acted under "color of any [state] statute."
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
5. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18-27 (1981).
6. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clanmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).
7. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
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history and purposes of section 1983 evince a congressional intent to pro-
tect federal rights of the kind at stake in grant programs, this Note argues
that any judicially imposed limitations on that cause of action should be
construed narrowly. It concludes by proposing rules to govern the applica-
tion of section 1983 to grant claims.
I. The Rights of Grant-in-Aid Beneficiaries
To understand the importance of the Court's recent section 1983 deci-
sions, it is essential to explore the nature of grant-in-aid programs and the
private rights they establish, as well as the Court's treatment of private
enforcement efforts prior to 1980. Before that time, private parties who
could benefit from grant conditions had only limited means by which to
secure them. Courts generally viewed grant beneficiaries as powerless in
relation to the enforcement of their statutorily defined rights.
A. The Nature of Grants-in-Aid
Grants create a relationship of "cooperative federalism."' The national
government retains substantial control over the aided programs, but state
and local governments bear responsibility for directly shaping and ad-
ministering those programs.' Congress employs grant programs when it
believes that benefits and services can be better provided through state and
local governments than through direct federal intervention.'0 Because the
goals underlying such arrangements would be defeated were Congress to
abdicate control over program expenditures, courts have long upheld Con-
gress' power to attach conditions to these funds."
8. R. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 14 (1970).
9. Grants often involve all levels of government in providing services. In order to achieve uniform
national program standards as well as to assume part of the financial burden, Congress provides funds
to assist the states in carrying out programs within the bounds established by federal law. This has
been termed a "marble cake" model of federalism, M. GRODZENS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8 (1966),
in which "no important function of government is the exclusive province of one of the levels," Note,
Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1184 (1977).
10. R. CAPPALLI, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL GRANTS 35 (1979). Cappalli identifies
five reasons why Congress has created grant-in-aid programs in such great number, rather than pro-
viding benefits and services directly: (1) in many areas, federal administrative machinery would dupli-
cate state or local agencies already providing comparable services; (2) direct federal administration
may foster local jealousy and hostility, while grants-in-aid to state and local governments may en-
courage support for federal intervention; (3) matching grants may be particularly useful for drawing
upon local government revenues to serve federal priorities; (4) grants-in-aid can improve state and
local government administration by conditioning the grant of federal funds on compliance with man-
agement directives; and (5) grants-in-aid may avoid federalism problems by respecting state and local
autonomy while allowing the national government to set policy priorities. Id.
11. The Constitution empowers Congress to expend funds in order to "provide for the. . . gen-
eral Welfare." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress' power to condition funds is limited, in theory,
by the requirements that funding restrictions provide for the "general welfare" and be reasonably
related to the purposes of the program itself. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66, 69 (1936). In
practice, these requirements have rarely invalidated grant conditions. The Court has held that Con-
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Although grant conditions primarily define the relationship between
state and federal agencies, they also create expectations for private parties
about how services or benefits will be provided. Congress, of course, can
change the requirements conditioning state participation in a grant pro-
gram or change the services the program provides, 2 and states may reject
federal funding if they do not want to accept the accompanying obliga-
tions.13 Within the terms of the federal-state funding agreements, how-
ever, private parties must receive benefits or services in the manner estab-
lished by the funding statute. The Court has recognized that grants, by
imposing obligations on both federal and state governments,14 create for
individuals a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to grant benefits. 5 Thus,
public grant conditibns translate into the language of individual rights.
B. Judicially Created Means of Enforcing Grant Conditions
As a rule, grant statutes provide little guidance on how private parties
can enforce "entitlements." Seldom does Congress explicitly authorize
suits by beneficiaries against either the grantee or the federal grantor. 6 In
gress can impose at least as many duties on the states through the spending power as it can through
its regulatory powers, and thus it may "further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of
federal moneys upon compliance with federal statutory and administrative objectives." Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474-75 (1980).
12. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) (finding no constitutional limitations on con-
gressional power to change entitlements).
13. E.g., Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 735 (1978) (states not required to participate in
federal welfare programs); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140 (1971) (local governments not re-
quired to accept funds under Housing Act of 1937); see Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482
(1923) (state may escape conditions by "simple expedient of not yielding"). But see Note, Taking
Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694, 1712-16
(1981) (arguing that even when state participation is voluntary, grant conditions should not be al-
lowed to influence state decisionmaking on matters of exclusive state responsibility).
14. Grant legislation uniformly obligates both the federal agency entrusted with carrying out the
law and the state or local grant recipient to abide by articulated standards, and to implement rules,
regulations, and guidelines in conformity with the statute. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6008 (1976) (impos-
ing such requirements in context of Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act); 20
U.S.C. § 2731 (Supp. V 1981) (same under Education Amendments of 1978); 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1976
& Supp. V 1981) (same under Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act).
15. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The Court distin-
guished between a mere "unilateral expectation" of a benefit and a "legitimate claim of entitlement"
to it. The latter must be derived from "rules or understandings that secure" the benefit to the intended
beneficiary. Id. Grant-in-aid laws governing the provision of benefits accomplish nothing if they do
not "secure" those benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62, 262 n.8 (1970) (welfare
benefits are matter of statutory entitlement for those qualified to receive them). See generally Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (increasing dependence on government largess requires
new concept of property rights in government support).
16. Grant statutes sometimes contain "citizen-suit" provisions imposing particular substantive and
procedural requirements for bringing private suits. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (Federal Water
Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1981) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)
(1982) (Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972). Other grant statutes allow private
parties more limited means of asserting rights to benefits. See Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act § 615(e), 20 U.S.C. § 415(e) (1982) (authorizing appeal to federal district courts of state
agency decisions concerning provision of free appropriate education to handicapped children).
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the absence of express private rights of action, courts have sometimes fash-
ioned remedies on the basis of three different theories. First, and most
significant, courts have implied a private right of action in the substantive
statute itself on the ground that Congress intended to provide a remedy
that it neglected to write into the statute.17 Second, courts have sometimes
treated grants as contracts between the federal and state governments and
permitted certain private parties to enforce their rights as third-party ben-
eficiaries."' Finally, courts have occasionally allowed statutory claims pen-
dent to colorable constitutional claims to be brought under section 1983.19
These judicially created remedies, however, have not helped private
plaintiffs a great deal. For one thing, courts have not always recognized
private rights of action.2" And when they have, they have severely re-
stricted the kinds of plaintiffs who can assert such rights,21 the kinds of
statutory provisions such plaintiffs can enforce,22 and the kinds of relief
17. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
18. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1270-71 (7th
Cir. 1981); Local Div. No. 714 v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Euresti
v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). In general, a third-party beneficiary may enforce contractual
duties when two conditions are met: the beneficiary's right to performance is "appropriate to effectu-
ate the intention of the parties" and the circumstances "indicate that the promisee intend[ed] to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
302 (1981); see 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 356, 356A (1959).
19. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
20. For example, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court adopted a four-part inquiry
for deciding whether a private right of action should be implied from a statute. Four members of the
Court recently criticized the test in these terms:
Surely it cannot be seriously argued that a mechanical application of the Cort analysis lends
"predictability" to implied right of action jurisprudence: including today's decision, five of the
last six statutory implied-right-of-action cases in which we have reviewed analysis by the
Courts of Appeals after Cort resulted in reversal of erroneous Court of Appeals decisions.
While this may be predictability of a sort, it is not the sort which the Court in Con v. Ash,
supra, or in any other case seeking to afford guidance to statutory construction intended.
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302-03 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
21. Under the Cort test, supra note 20, only a plaintiff "of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted" could assert any implied private right of action. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
22. For example, the courts' restrictive reading of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§
701-796 (1982), has led to inconsistencies in private enforcement. Section 503 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
793, requires that certain federal contractors take affirmative action to employ and advance in employ-
ment qualified handicapped individuals. Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794, prohibits discrimination on the
basis of handicap in programs receiving federal financial assistance. A majority of the circuits has
found that § 504 creates a-private right of action. See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658
F.2d 1372, 1377 (10th Cir. 1981). But see Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d
672, 674-75 (8th Cir.) (no private right of action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980). The Supreme
Court has indicated that it agrees with the majority view. See Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808
(1977). On the other hand, the courts have unanimously held that § 503 does not create a private
right of action. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 889 (1981); Note, Private Rights of Action for Handicapped Persons Under Section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 453, 476-92 (1979).
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available.23 The courts have also applied strictly the requirements for en-
forcement of statutory provisions by third-party beneficiaries.2 4 Further-
more, a plaintiff cannot always manage to bring colorable constitutional
claims along with statutory ones. As a result, individuals have been able to
obtain only sporadic and inadequate enforcement of grant conditions
through such means.
C. Section 1983 and Grant Claims
It was against this background that the Court decided Maine v.
Thiboutot.2 5 In that case, the Court allowed private welfare recipients to
bring suit under section 1983 to challenge a denial by state officials of
federal social security benefits.2" Although the Court asserted that it was
merely stating explicitly what it had established sub silentio in prior opin-
ions,27 it held for the first time that section 1983 "means what it says"
and provides a private cause of action for violation of federal statutory law
by state and local officials.28 The Court avoided saying, however, that sec-
tion 1983 provided a remedy for the violation of all federal statutes.29
One year after Thiboutot was decided, the Court retreated from any
such broad theory. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,30
the Court considered whether the Bill of Rights section of the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DDA Act)"1 created
substantive rights enforceable by mentally retarded individuals housed in
state institutions.3 2 The Court decided it did not. It viewed the DDA Act
23. See Transameriea Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (private suit under
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982), may seek to void investment
advisers contract, but no other relief available).
24. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 37 (1977); German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 230 (1912); Williams v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 608 F.2d
1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1979).
25. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
27. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
28. Id. Justice Brennan, for the majority, wrote:
The question before us is whether the phrase "and laws," as used in § 1983, means what it
says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no
modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents'
claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act.
Id.
29. The Court held only that § 1983 "undoubtedly embraces the respondents' claim" in the case
before it. Id. It did not explicitly state that § 1983 would be available for all statutory claims. The
holding has, however, been so interpreted. See id. at 11 (Powell, J., dissenting); Comment, Statutorily
Based Federal Rights: A New Role for Section 1983, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 547, 551 (1981).
30. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
31. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6107
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
32. The DDA Act aids states in caring for the developmentally disabled. States electing to partici-
pate in the grant program must submit a plan to the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services in order to receive federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 6063(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). After
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as a "mere federal-state funding statute,""3 intended to encourage, but not
to coerce, the states to develop certain programs."' The Court balked at
the idea of imposing affirmative obligations on the states in the context of
a "cooperative program of shared responsibilit[ies]." 5 If Congress wants a
grant program to create substantive rights, the Court held, Congress must
clearly state that those rights are a condition of the statutory "contract. '38
The Court did acknowledge, however, that the DDA Act imposed some
obligations upon states. In particular, it found that the DDA Act required
states to submit assurances that they would administer state programs so
as to protect the rights of those defined by the Act as "developmentally
disabled."'3 7 The Court nevertheless raised, without answering, the ques-
tion of whether an individual's "interest" in these assurances constituted a
"right secured" by federal law and enforceable by means of section
1983.38
Later that year, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Association,"9 the Court retreated still further from
Thiboutot. In this case, the Court considered whether an express remedial
provision in a statute could preclude a section 1983 cause of action. 0 The
Court found that by providing "unusually elaborate enforcement provi-
sions, conferring authority to sue . . . both on government officials and
the Secretary has approved it, the states receive funds that must be spent in accordance with the plan
and the requirements of the statute. Id. § 6062(a). The DDA Act requires, in particular, that the
state have "in effect for each developmentally disabled person who receives services from or under the
program a habilitation plan." Id. § 6011 (a). In addition, the Act's "bill of rights" provision requires
that "[tlhe treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities . . . be
designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and . . . be provided in the setting
that is least restrictive of the person's liberty." Id. § 6010(2). At issue in Pennhurst was whether
providing "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive environment" constituted a right enforcea-
ble against the states. See 451 U.S. at 2.
33. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18.
34. Id. The Court drew an analogy between grant-in-aid programs enacted pursuant to the
spending power and contracts: "[I]n return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the Spending Power thus
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.'" Id. at 17
(emphasis added).
35. Id. at 22 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309 (1980)).
36. Id. at 17. The voluntary nature of the grant relationship requires that "if Congress intends to
impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously" so that states may
"exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation." Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
38. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28.
39. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
40. In Sea Clammers, respondents had brought suit against various federal and state entities and
officials alleging damage to fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewerage and
other waste. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages
under the federal common law of nuisance, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976). The Court noted that, although the
parties had not suggested it, "there remains a possible alternative source of express congressional
authorization of private suits under the[se] Acts"-that is, § 1983. Sea Clamnmers, 453 U.S. at 19.
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private citizens,"4 1 Congress had foreclosed a section 1983 action under
the two acts at issue. To the Court, these enforcement provisions meant
that "Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropri-
ate."' 42 Because the Court found that the statutory remedies excluded pri-
vate suits under section 1983,43 it did not reach the question of whether
the acts created enforceable substantive rights.
These cases leave two important questions unanswered. First, what
must the nature of one's "interest" in the enforcement of a grant condition
be in order to bring suit under section 1983 ? 4 Second, under what cir-
cumstances will a grant statute's express remedy preclude section 1983
relief?45 Although the Court decided to preclude section 1983 claims in
Sea Clammers, it left open in Pennhurst the question of whether the
DDA Act's own enforcement remedy, withdrawal of federal funds, ex-
cluded section 1983 claims.
II. The Broad Scope of Section 1983
The Supreme Court has discerned in section 1983 a broad intent to
restructure federal-state relations. Such intent supports not only the stat-
ute's expanded application to a wide range of constitutional claims, but
also its use in protecting the federal rights at stake in grant programs. In
Pennhurst and Sea Clammers, however, the Court held that when Con-
gress creates these rights, it may intend that they not be strictly enforcea-
ble or that they be enforceable through only certain means. Thus, only by
exploring the Court's two unanswered questions is it possible to determine
the scope of section 1983 in enforcing grant conditions.
A. Evolution of the Section 1983 Remedy
Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,46 a congressional response to the failure of Southern states to sup-
press Ku Klux Klan violence against blacks during the Reconstruction
41. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13.
42. Id. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular act are
sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the rem-
edy of suits under § 1983." Id. at 20.
43. Id. at 21. One member of the Court found, however, that because both of the statutes at issue
contained a savings clause preserving enforcement rights under other statutes, it was "remarkable"
that the Court could discern a congressional intent to withdraw § 1983 coverage. Id. at 30 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Because the environmental statutes were enacted on behalf of the general public and
not for the protection of a special class, Stevens accepted the majority's holding that Congress had
created no new private damages remedy under § 1983. Id. at 32-33.
44. See supra p. 1006.
45. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 n.11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("the only excep-
tion [to the application of § 1983 in the statutory context] will be in cases where the governing statute
provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms").
46. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
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period.47 Although its immediate aim was narrow, Congress framed the
statute in general terms, providing a federal cause of action for the depri-
vation, under color of state law, of "any rights. . . secured by the Consti-
tution and laws" of the United States. 8
Although the Court construed section 1983 narrowly at first,49 it has
since expanded the section's scope beyond the particular problem it was
designed to correct. 50 The Court has declared that section 1983 engen-
dered a "vast transformation" of earlier concepts of federalism51 and was
evidence of Congress' intent to "interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights.
'52
Developments in judicial doctrine over the past twenty years have pro-
vided further reason for reading section 1983 expansively. First, as the
Court gave new life and content to the due process and equal protection
clauses, 53 it extended section 1983 to provide a remedy for deprivation of
those rights, even when the issues raised did not fall within the statute's
traditional "civil rights" focus. 54 Second, it treated more actions as "under
color of" state law55 for purposes of section 1983. Third, it narrowed the
47. See Note, supra note 9, at 1153-56.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)
("[A]lthough [§ 1983] was enacted because of the conditions that existed in the South at that time, it is
cast in general language . . ").
49. Despite its broad language and purpose, § 1983 was initially given extremely limited applica-
tion; it was primarily confined to deprivations of voting rights, and even that use was largely ineffec-
tive. See Note, supra note 9, at 1161 n.139, 1167-69.
50. In Thiboutot the Court acknowledged that the legislative history of the provision is somewhat
ambiguous. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 (1980). Nonetheless, the Court has, over time, broad-
ened the scope of § 1983. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 87-92 (1973)
(citing wide sweep of claims covered by § 1983); Note, supra note 9, at 1167-75.
51. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (legislative history of § 1983 "makes evident
that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation
with respect to the protection of federally created rights"); see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99
(1980) (debates surrounding enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1871 show that strong motive for pas-
sage was congressional concern that state courts inadequately protected federal rights).
52. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
53. On the expansion of the due process clause, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
10-9 (1978); on the expansion of equal protection, see Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). The Court has also held that many of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus are now applicable to the
states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
54. For expanded applications of the due process clause, see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972) (university tenure decision); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (state replevin law);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (termination of welfare benefits). For expanded applications of the equal protection clause, see,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (durational residency requirement); Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (legislative apportion-
ment); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education).
55. Section 1983 applies to deprivations of rights "under color of" state law, regulation or prac-
tice. See supra note 1. Initially, the courts interpreted that phrase to cover only actions within a state
officer's legal authority. Thus, § 1983 applied only if the state law providing the officer's authority
itself violated the federal Constitution. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). In United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), however, a criminal case, the Court expanded the coverage of the
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immunities available to both state agencies and officials as a defense to
liability under section 1983.56 Thus, the Court's conception of the reme-
dial purposes of section 1983 has provided a basis for extending it beyond
its initially limited application.
These jurisprudential developments were themselves the product of
changing perceptions of the government's role in relation to its citizens.
Two changes have been particularly influential. First, the federal govern-
ment has moved beyond the role of passively protecting a small set of
individual rights through the courts. Instead, Congress has used its regu-
latory and spending powers to create and effectuate new individual
rights.57 Grants-in-aid have been, of course, one of its most important
tools. Second, demands for governmental accountability have become in-
creasingly strident, and new mechanisms have been developed to control
abuses of governmental power.58 In response to these trends, the courts
have broadened section 1983's protection against state deprivations of fed-
erally guaranteed rights.59 Both these policies apply with equal force to
federal rights created by grant legislation.
B. Defining the Contours of Section 1983 in the Grant Context
This is not to suggest that section 1983 should be available to any
plaintiff who seeks to enforce any grant condition. Rather, as the Court
itself has suggested, some limitations must exist along two dimensions:
Standards must be developed to identify those plaintiffs who may utilize
section 1983 to enforce a given grant provision and to determine which
grant provisions may be enforced by means of section 1983 litigation.
"under color" requirement to actions involving abuse of legal authority. That principle was extended
to civil claims under § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
56. Under § 1983, the Court has allowed plaintiffs to bring damage actions against state officials
subject to a qualified "good faith" immunity. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). Further,
the Court has held that prospective relief is permissible even when it may have a significant effect on
state treasuries. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974). The Court has even withdrawn the
good faith immunity to § 1983 suit once available to municipalities. Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980); see Greenhouse, After Ill Years, Federal Rights Law Faces Grilling, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 7, 1982, at E2, col. I (describing congressional move to restore municipal "good faith"
defense).
57. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973a-1973p (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (as amended); Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1453 (1982). See Cox, The Role of Congress in
Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971) (discussing congressional power to
define and enforce constitutional rights).
58. See Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials
for Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 281 (1980) (discussing existing and proposed mechanisms for chal-
lenging official abuse).
59. One federal judge has argued that § 1983 requires even more radical restructuring if it is to
serve as an effective deterrent to unlawful action by state officials. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreak-
ers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87
YALE L.J. 447 (1978).
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1. Identifying the Appropriate Section 1983 Plaintiff ,
In addition to limiting the rights created by grant statutes, the Court in
Pennhurst raised an elusive question: When is a particular plaintiff's in-
terest in enforcing a grant condition sufficient for that condition to become
a "right secured" to him or her within the meaning of section 1983?"o As
thus formulated, this question raised concerns traditionally discussed
under the doctrine of standing.6' In this context, the Court has read the
"case or controversy" clause of Article III of the Constitution 2 to require,
at minimum, a showing of "distinct and palpable injury" and some causal
relationship between the defendant's illegal act and that injury. 3 Thus, to
satisfy the Article III standing requirement in a section 1983 claim, a
private party must show that a statute creates a right and that a state has
violated this right, thereby injuring the individual.
In certain circumstances, the Court has imposed prudential limits that
are even more demanding than those imposed by Article III.64 The Court
has, for example, imposed prudential standing restrictions in cases in
which the asserted harm is shared nearly equally by most citizens.6 5 In
such "public" disputes, the Court has used standing to determine whether
the provision on which the claim rests allows judicial review for the class
of persons in plaintiff's position. 6 In this sense, standing doctrine closely
resembles the doctrine of implied private rights of action.67 In implied
60. See supra pp. 1006-07.
61. The standing doctrine limits the right to bring suit in federal courts. A party has standing to
sue if he has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely de-
pends for illumination of difficult. . . questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) ("[S]tanding is a question of whether a plaintiff is suffi-
ciently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case or controversy, or at least to overcome
prudential limits on federal-court jurisdiction."); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHS-
LER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 156 (2d ed. 1973)
(standing concerns whether plaintiff has "sufficient personal interest" to warrant relief if he estab-
lishes illegality alleged and doctrine is thus "inextricably bound up with the whole law of rights and
remedies").
62. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
63. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978).
64. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
65. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974); Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634
(1937).
66. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
67. In deciding whether to imply a private cause of action, courts apply the four-factor test articu-
lated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), to determine the "ultimate issue" of whether Congress
intended to create a private right of action. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). The
"threshold" inquiry is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the
plaintiff is a member. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-94 (1979). The Court's
standing inquiry in public disputes-whether the statutory provision on which plaintiffs rely creates a
right to judicial review for a certain class of persons-focuses on the same point.
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private action cases, courts have effectively prevented private parties from
enforcing statutory provisions, the violation of which caused them injury,
if those statutes create duties not for particular groups, but for the benefit
of the public at large."'
It would be inappropriate, however, to apply these prudential require-
ments to suits brought under section 1983. Section 1983 provides an ex-
press private right to judicial review of state action. Having demonstrated
that a funding statute creates enforceable "rights,"6 a plaintiff should not
also be required to show that Congress enacted the statute or imposed the
grant conditions in order to benefit a small group of which he or she is a
member. That test, which may be useful in limiting judicially created
remedies, is inappropriate when suit is brought under an express statutory
remedy, like section 1983, containing its own cause of action require-
ments.70 In short, the congressionally defined elements of a section 1983
action-the violation of federal rights under color of state law-should not
be constricted by extra-constitutional standing requirements.
2. The Presumption in Favor of Enforcement Through Section 1983
Courts usually permit private enforcement of grant conditions when
they find in the grant statute a legislative intent to permit such enforce-
ment."1 Without evidence of such intent, courts typically refuse to imply
private remedies. 2 Thus, statutory silence creates a presumption against
private enforcement."
The limitation on the courts' remedial power rests on the theory that
68. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-94 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1979).
69. See supra p. 1003.
70. Indeed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine for whom Congress enacted a
grant statute in many cases. Grants-in-aid are designed to benefit individuals, states and localities, and
to promote the general welfare. Grants must provide for the general welfare in order to serve as a
legitimate exercise of the spending power. See supra note 11.
71. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689, 709 (1979) (implying private
right of action under statute aiming to benefit clearly identifiable group); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397, 420 (1970) (implying private right of action because Congress unlikely to have intended to pro-
vide no effective remedy to those directly affected by grant program); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261
(7th Cir. 1981) (tenants of housing subsidized by Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) had enforceable third-party beneficiary rights under statute authorizing HUD to make sub-
sidy payments to landlord).
72. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981).
73. See generally Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death
Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333,
1386 (1980) (arguing that implied private right of action cases illustrate judicial restraint except in
compelling circumstances); Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 51 (1979) (noting that Court has placed burden on Congress to express
clearly its intent to provide private right of action); Note, Implied Causes of Action: A New Analytical
Framework, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 141, 166-67 (1980) (concluding that recent implied right of action
doctrine restrains judiciary in filling gaps left by legislature).
1011
The Yale Law Journal
Congress itself should specify remedies when it creates rights and not
leave to the courts the task of matching rights and remedies in a piecemeal
fashion."4 This theory changes the long-prevailing presumption that reme-
dies follow rights75 into the new presumption that silence rules out judi-
cially created private enforcement mechanisms. This new presumption,
however, should not affect section 1983 analysis. This section provides for
private enforcement on its face, and, as an express remedy, should over-
come any presumption created by silence in the underlying substantive
statute.
76
The broad availability of section 1983 as a remedial device, however,
raises the many concerns that have prompted the Court's recent search for
doctrines to confine it. This search is premature, for it is possible to ad-
dress these concerns without limiting the scope of the statute.
III. Section 1983 and the Grant Enforcement Scheme
Some courts have reasoned that applying section 1983 to grant claims
disrupts the enforcement procedures established by Congress in the grant
statutes themselves.77 There are two typical remedial provisions in such
statutes. One empowers the federal agency that administers the grant to
terminate or reduce funding if states fail to comply with grant condi-
tions. 76 The other specifies judicial review procedures for private parties
74. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at
749 (Powell, J., dissenting); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979).
75. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[W]here federally protected rights have
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies
so as to grant the necessary relief."); Kendall v. United States, 27 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838)
("monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a
clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803) ("[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded."). See generally Note, Implied Rights of Action in
Federal Legislation: Harmonization Within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DUKE L.J. 928 (discussing
presumption that statutory rights should be enforceable).
76. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 27 n.11
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28
(1981) (Thiboutot held that "§ 1983 provides a cause of action for state deprivations of 'rights se-
cured' by 'the laws' of the United States").
77. See Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1216-17 (7th Cir. 1981) (enforcement of Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Virginia State Water Con-
trol Bd., 501 F. Supp. 821, 828-29 (E.D. Va. 1980) (enforcement of Federal Water Pollution Control
Act).
78. Almost all grant statutes allow the federal agency administering the program to terminate or
reduce federal funds if the grantee fails to comply with the funding conditions. The statute usually
provides the state agency with notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to terminating its funds.
See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 101(c), 29 U.S.C. § 721(c) (1982); Comprehensive Employ-
ment and Training Act of 1973 § 108, 29 U.S.C. § 818 (1976); Public Health Service Act §
315(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 247(c)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Some statutes bar cutting off a state's
funding as long as the state makes good-faith efforts to comply with the grant conditions. See 42
U.S.C. § 604(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). Recently Con-
gress has also provided for federal recovery of illegal grant expenditures as a further penalty for
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to enforce grant conditions.79 The issue is whether Congress intended
these statutory remedial provisions to be exclusive, and, therefore, whether
section 1983 should be precluded as a means of enforcement.
A. Federal Agency Enforcement
The traditional arguments for relying exclusively upon federal agencies
to ensure state compliance with grant conditions is that these agencies
have expertise in the subject matter of the grant programs and are able to
apply uniform standards.80 Certain practical obstacles, however, prevent
federal agencies from adequately overseeing grant programs. The number,
complexity, and size of the programs make effective monitoring difficult.8"
Furthermore, when an agency discovers noncompliance, it may be reluc-
tant to cut off or reduce funding lest it jeopardize state participation in the
grant program.82 As a result, federal agencies often engage in protracted
negotiations to avoid funding sanctions and seldom actually enforce fund-
ing conditions.
83
noncompliance. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456a(b)(6) (1982) (Coastal Zone Management Act).
79. See supra note 16.
80. See Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding HEW far better equipped
than courts to review alleged inconsistency between complex state statutory scheme and federal statute
because of its acknowledged expertise in field), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). Some
grant statutes, however, lack explicit agency enforcement provisions. Compare Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-407 (1982) and4Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (1982); National School Lunch Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769a (1976 & Supp. V
1981) with statutes cited supra note 78. In the absence of any express enforcement mechanism, the
administering agency is usually permitted to develop "reasonable" procedures. For a discussion of
agency noncompliance hearings, see R. CAPPALLI, supra note 10, at 244-71.
81. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 10, at 65 (finding important conditions ignored because of huge
volume of grants and contracts).
82. Cutting off funding is too drastic a remedy to be frequently employed. See id. at 90-94; Tom-
linson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for
Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 620 (1972); Wilcox, The Function and Nature of
Grants, 22 AD. L. REv. 125, 131 (1970); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 84, 91 (1967); see also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 426 (1970) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (finding HEW reluctant to cut off funds to noncomplying states); United States v.
Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (arguing cutoff would punish beneficiaries rather
than enforce grant conditions), modified sub nom. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala.
1972), afi'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). In contrast, specific performance of grant conditions may
be available through a § 1983 suit, at least within the term of the congressional appropriation. Com-
pare United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 440-41 (7th Cir.) (court not limited to prohibit-
ing action in violation of statute, but may also require affirmative action to assure compliance with
grant conditions), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) and United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. at
1083 (United States may seek judicial enforcement of terms and conditions of grants of federal prop-
erty; administrative remedy of termination of assistance is not exclusive) with PAAC v. Rizzo, 502
F.2d 306, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1974) (federal requirements in grant statutes binding on question of eligi-
bility, but not substantively binding on grantee), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). In general, courts
have substantial flexibility in the relief they afford and can avoid imposing drastic sanctions against
state grantees, while preserving for private parties the benefits of the grant program. See Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 54 (White, J., dissenting) (citing approach taken in
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1970)).
83. See Note, supra note 82, at 91.
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In the face of the growing number and complexity of federal grant pro-
grams, any federal agency expertise provides limited safeguards. Federal
agencies often cannot determine accurately whether a state has complied
with grant terms.84 Private parties from whom the agency could easily
obtain information about the program may be entirely excluded from the
agency compliance proceedings.8 5 Even when individuals do register their
complaints, so long as state performance appears adequate on report
forms,8" the monitoring agency may believe the problem is limited and
non-systemic.
87
In addition, federal agency enforcement proceedings may prejudice the
interests of states. Entrusting the resolution of conflicting federal and state
interpretations of the grant statute to the federal agency makes the agency
both arbiter and participant in the same proceeding. Federal courts, on
the other hand, are "relatively more expert" than agencies in interpreting
federal law,8 have discretion to weigh the state's reading of grant require-
ments as well as to solicit the views of the federal agency, and are thus
more likely to reach an unbiased decision.
89
Private enforcement of grant conditions through section 1983 supple-
ments federal agency enforcement.9 Nothing suggests, moreover, that pri-
vate enforcement would undermine either the agencies' expertise or their
ability to apply uniform standards. Section 1983 enforcement would also
84. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 10, at 81; Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 82, at 619-30.
85. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 n.41 (1979) (complaint procedure
adopted by HEW in Title IX cases makes no provision for complainants to participate in investiga-
tion or enforcement proceedings). In general, private parties have no formal means by which they can
bring their complaints before a federal agency. Note, supra note 82, at 90-91.
One theoretically useful vehicle for private instigation of agency action suits, § 10 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982), has proved of little practical effect. Although courts
have on rare occasions ordered agencies to initiate enforcement proceedings, see Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), agency failure to enforce is generally unreviewable, see,
e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1958); FTC v.
Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929). Moreover, judicial review of such failure may be limited to the
reasons the agency offers for its refusal to act. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975);
DeVito v. Schultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969).
86. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 10, at 65-66. In monitoring grantees, it is standard practice to
rely on their good faith reporting. Those states conscious of their own noncompliance are often able to
prepare reports that on their face do not reveal any deficiency; required reports do not comprehen-
sively disclose program conditions.
87. See id. at 66-67.
88. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) (quoting Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S.
1, 14 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
89. Courts should elicit the federal agency's opinion in interpreting the federal law in question,
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970), and have often directly and indirectly considered the
federal agency's interpretation of the statute at issue. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 24 n.18, 50 n.15 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 708 n.42 (1979); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
90. Cf Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 n.42 (1979) ("HEW's enforcement
capabilities under Title IX are especially limited in precisely those areas where private suits can be
most effective.").
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not disrupt the goals and programs of federal agencies as much as private
actions to force agencies to supervise grant programs. 1
B. Express Judicial Remedies
Whether section 1983 enforcement disrupts an express private remedy
is a more difficult question. Whenever Congress expressly provides an av-
enue for judicial review, it can be argued that it intends that remedy to be
exclusive. This argument rests upon the presumption of exclusivity encap-
sulated in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.2 Thus, courts
generally refuse to imply a private right of action when the underlying
substantive statute itself contains an express remedial provision, regardless
of whether this provision provides adequate relief.93 The presumption
may be overcome, however, when there is evidence of legislative intent to
provide an additional private remedy,94 for then it is clear that Congress
intended to provide more than a single remedy. Because section 1983 is
such an express remedy, it should not be presumptively precluded by al-
ternative express statutory judicial remedies in the grant context.95
This is not to say that application of section 1983 is never barred by a
statutory scheme. However, because section 1983 overcomes the presump-
tion of the statute's remedial exclusivity, the burden should fall on the
party asserting the preclusive effect of a statute's remedial provisions to
show that Congress in fact intended to withhold section 1983 relief.
That burden could be met in two circumstances: (1) when the statute
contains a statement expressly excluding section 1983 or private rights of
91. Cf id. at 707 n.41 (alternative to agency enforcement, suit under Administrative Procedure
Act to compel agency to investigate and cut off funds, is more disruptive of HEW's efforts to allocate
enforcement resources than private suit against recipient would be).
92. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974) ("When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any
other mode.") (quoting Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)).
93. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979) (express private rights
of action in some sections of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 preclude implication of private rights of
action under some other sections); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420-
21 (1975) (provision for enforcement by congressionally-created corporate entity incompatible with
implied right of action); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (public cause of action created by Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 is exclu-
sive means of enforcement).
94. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974) (general principle that when legislation expressly provides particular remedy courts should not
imply another "must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent").
95. At least one lower court has gone so far as to find the cause of action under § 1983 to be
excluded by an implied private right of action in a grant statute. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171
(D.N.H. 1981). Implied remedies should never be allowed to preclude § 1983 actions. Because Con-
gress has created an express vehicle for challenging violations of a federal statute in § 1983, that
remedy should be available in the first instance, making resort to an implied private right of action
unnecessary.
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action in general,96 or (2) when the statute provides for judicial review but
restricts the private relief available.9 7 In the first case, congressional intent
is clear. In the second, the court may infer that Congress considered pri-
vate judicial relief in drafting the statute, but chose a particular remedial
scheme for the law in question. These circumscribed remedies, more-
over, often conflict directly with the requirements imposed by section
1983. In such cases, the courts should hold plaintiffs to the more stringent
requirements of the specific statutory scheme.99 In cases where no conflict
arises between the statutory scheme and section 1983, however, there is no
reason for courts to infer exclusivity.100
96. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-51 n.5 (1970) ("very doubtful" whether
§ 1983 relief available when statute provided that injunction was "exclusive means of enforcing the
rights based on this title").
97. The adequacy of the review provided must, of course, be assessed before precluding a cause of
action under § 1983. In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20 (1981), for example, the Court stated that
when the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they
may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under §
1983. . . . It is hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action
when it created so many specific statutory remedies including the two citizen-suit provisions.
Accord Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976) (balance, completeness, and struc-
tural integrity of § 717 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 make it exclusive judicial remedy for claims of
discrimination in federal employment); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (specific
remedy of habeas corpus is appropriate remedy and must override general terms of § 1983); cf. Great
Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) (granting relief under § 1985
would impair effectiveness of Title VII's specific private remedy).
98. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (entirely appropriate for Congress, in creat-
ing statutory rights, to determine who may enforce them and in what manner). Congress may, of
course, preserve other remedies even when creating specific private suit provisions. See Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21 n.31, 27-31 (1981)
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that savings clause provisions provided expression of congressional
intent to preserve availability of § 1983 remedies).
99. Cf. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1979) (holding §
1985 unavailable to plaintiffs who would otherwise "avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific
provisions of the law [of Title VII]"); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976)
(precluding action under § 1983 because § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "with its rigorous
administrative exhaustion requirements and time limitations, would be driven out of currency were
immediate access to the courts under other, less demanding statutes permissible").
100. Compare Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981) with Quackenbush v.
Johnson City School Dist., 716 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1426 (1984). The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401-1453 (1982), at
issue in both cases, provides an avenue of judicial review for plaintiffs who have satisfied certain
procedural prerequisites. After finding that Congress had not made damages available under the
EAHCA, the Anderson court held that plaintiffs could not circumvent the statute's restrictions by
resort to § 1983. The court reasoned that to allow plaintiffs to elect a § 1983 remedy, thereby ob-
taining damages, would impair the effectiveness of the EAHCA's carefully constructed enforcement
system. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1213.
In Quackenbush, however, the Second Circuit found that the judicial remedy provided by the
EAHCA was exclusive only for purposes of reviewing final administrative decisions about the place-
ment of handicapped children. It held that defendants who had prevented plaintiffs from exhausting
the procedural requirements of the statute could not assert the unavailability of § 1983 relief. If
plaintiffs had no meaningful recourse to the statutory remedy, then they must have access to § 1983
and the relief provided by that statute.
For different analysis of preemption of a § 1983 claim by a statutory remedial scheme, see Sun-
stein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1982).
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C. Infringement of State Autonomy
Justice Powell has expressed the fear that applying section 1983
broadly will disrupt the relationship between federal and state agencies in
administering grant programs.1 ' He has warned that the Thiboutot deci-
sion will burden federal courts with cases harassing state and local offi-
cials responsible for implementing federal assistance programs. 10 2 In addi-
tion, he fears that federal courts will use section 1983 to gain
"unprecedented -authority" over state actions'03 and interfere with the
states' judicial and administrative remedial processes.
1. Burden on State Administration
Specifically, concerns have been raised that allowing individuals to hold
state and local officials liable under section 1983 for violations of federal
grant requirements would unfairly impose upon the states full liability for
the deprivation of rights in programs established as joint federal-state ven-
tures. 0 4 It should be noted, however, that section 1983 imposes no greater
obligations on states than are contained in the grant statute itself. By ac-
cepting funds, states also accept the accompanying statutory requirements.
In injunctive suits against state officials under section 1983, private parties
ask no more than to insure that those requirements are met;0 5 in damage
actions, they seek compensation for injury caused by the illegal actions of
state officers, where those actions lie outside the scope of the "good faith"
immunity from liability. 0 6
101. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 23. After noting that the United States Code contains "literally hundreds of coopera-
tive regulatory and social welfare enactments," Justice Powell found that "those who might benefit
from these grants now will be potential § 1983 plaintiffs." Id. at 22-23.
103. Id. at 23-35.
104. Id. at 23-24. Congress may vary the amount of responsibility it places on states in adminis-
tering grant programs. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (1982) (state bears full responsibility for develop-
ing plan to assist handicapped children) with 42 U.S.C. § 622 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (federal and
state agencies jointly develop plan for child welfare services). The allocation of responsibility in a
particular case could well determine a court's assessment of liability for noncompliance and affect the
relief it provides.
105. Concerns about judicial interference with state autonomy loom largest where a court deter-
mines that an injunction is necessary to bring about systemic relief in a § 1983 case. It was relief of
this sort that the lower courts had determined to be necessary in Pennhurst. In such cases, the court's
duty is only to insure that the minimal requirements of the law are met. Cf Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (prescribing minimum "medical and Constitutional" standards of
treatment for civilly committed mental patients), enforcing 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afl'd
in part, rev'd in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 54 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that appropriate procedure once liability under § 1983 was determined would be
for court to announce what state must do to comply with DDA Act and then allow appropriate period
for state to decide whether to comply with conditions set by court or to give up federal funding).
106. See supra note 56.
1017
The Yale Law Journal
2. Conflict with State Judicial Remedies
Some states provide for judicial review in state courts of state agency
decisions. 10 7 These state review provisions, however, do not bar section
1983 claims. The Court has repeatedly held that plaintiffs need not ex-
haust state judicial remedies before asserting section 1983 claims in fed-
eral court.10 " The fundamental purpose of section 1983, it has recognized,
is to provide individuals with a supplemental remedy for violation of their
federal rights. 09
Policy considerations support this scheme. First, federal courts are bet-
ter equipped to resolve federal statutory claims. Federal judges are more
familiar with federal law and are more likely to be insulated from politi-
cal pressures.1 0 Second, federal courts are more likely to apply federal
law to the states uniformly. 1 Finally, to the extent that state court judg-
ments are binding in subsequent federal litigation, exhaustion of state ju-
dicial remedies might preclude meaningful federal judicial review." 2
3. Interference with State Administrative Remedies
States often establish administrative procedures for handling grievances
or investigating allegations of noncompliance either in response to specific
federal statutory directives, 3 federal administrative regulations,1 ' consti-
tutional due process requirements," 5 or practical necessity.
Section 1983, however, does not require exhausting these state adminis-
trative remedies before suit in federal court.1 6 Congress, the Court has
found, intended not to require exhaustion in order to create an effective
supplemental remedy.
17
107. See, e.g., N.Y. APA §§ 100-307 (McKinney Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-166 to
-189 (1981).
108. This principle was first established in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
109. Id. at 183.
110. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
111. See Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1970).
112. As a general rule, the principles of resjudicata and collateral estoppel apply to § 1983 claims
relitigated in federal court except when state law does not provide fair procedures or the state court
fails even to acknowledge the principle on which the litigant based its claim. Migra v. Warren City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 896-98 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101, 105
(1980).
113. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 722(a) (1982); Aid and Services to Needy
Families with Children, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1976); Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6012 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
114. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 35.939 (1983) (requiring establishment of procedure for resolving
protests over use of environmental grant funds); 7 C.F.R. § 246.24, 42 Fed. Reg. 43,223 (1977)
(establishing procedure for special supplemental food program).
115. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
116. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
117. Id. at 502-12 (reviewing legislative history of § 1983). Prior to this decision, courts had
sometimes performed the task of evaluating the adequacy of state processes before determining
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Several policies counsel against an absolute exhaustion requirement.
First, most state administrative processes are inherently defective in that
they cannot generate a uniform or binding body of law establishing the
rights of grant beneficiaries in particular programs."1 8 Second, administra-
tive relief may be so limited in scope that some valid claims are effectively
without remedy."1 9 Even when administrative procedures can address a
particular grievance, they are in most cases incapable of effecting systemic
reform. 2  Third, it is unlikely that agency administrators considering a
claim will be able to provide independent judgments when parties chal-
lenge the policies their own agency has adopted.
1 21
Where Congress requires states to establish administrative procedures
to adjudicate claimi, it may also choose to require exhaustion of those
procedures. Any such requirement should not be lightly adopted, however,
and must respect the purposes of section 1983. A plaintiff should be com-
pelled to exhaust administrative procedures only where such procedures
are fully capable of providing the relief sought by his claim. The defend-
ant arguing exhaustion should bear the burden of demonstrating that state
administrative remedies are indeed adequate. Furthermore, even when the
court determines that state procedures are satisfactory as an initial matter,
it should retain jurisdiction over the section 1983 claim pending the out-
come of the administrative procedures. 122 In this way, a court can make
whether exhaustion should be required in a § 1983 suit. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 n.14
(1973); McNeese v. Board of Educ. for Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668, 674-75
(1963); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969).
118. See Note, supra note 82, at 94 (most fundamental inadequacy of the state fair hearing proce-
dure is that it generates no uniform and binding body of law).
119. In most states, agencies are either unwilling or ineffective forums for adjudicating challenges
to state regulations or regulatory practices. They are best equipped to hear claims involving applica-
tion of state or federal law to a particular plaintiff. Furthermore, although state agencies can usually
take some corrective measures, they may not be able to grant injunctions, declaratory relief, or
damages.
120. This incapacity flows from the administrative agencies' inability to produce a uniform body
of law, and their severely limited ability to grant relief.
121. See Note, supra note 82, at 92. Some state agencies have held that they have no power to
decide the legality of state regulatory provisions. In those states which consider such challenges, it
seems difficult to obtain effective adjudication on the merits, since "[tlhe persons responsible for the
final decision in a fair hearing are generally the persons who have promulgated the regulations under
attack." Id.
122. By keeping a § 1983 claim on its docket pending exhaustion of administrative or similar
remedies, a court can exert pressure upon the state administrative process and ensure that it is effi-
cient as well as effective. Furthermore, when a court retains a § 1983 case pending exhaustion, the
plaintiffs may be able to collect attorney's fees for the state administrative action. See Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 128-29 (1980) (attorney's fees available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in a § 1983
case involving statutory violations, even though respondent prevailed through settlement rather than
through litigation); cf. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (award of fees for
attorney's efforts in state administrative proceeding that must be pursued under Title VII prior to
filing charge with EEOC). But see Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (plain-
tiff may not obtain attorney's fees when the court determines that § 1983 cause of action basically
redundant to private cause of action provided by statute's remedial scheme).
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certain that the state has adequately considered the claim, and can also
provide additional relief if necessary. Retaining jurisdiction would fully
protect the rights of grant beneficiaries while providing scope for the oper-
ation of state administrative remedies.12
D. Burden on the Federal Courts
Finally, concerns have been voiced about how applying section 1983 to
claims under grant-in-aid statutes might increase the caseload of the fed-
eral courts.12  Without question, the expansion of the scope of section
1983 has increased federal court litigation over the past two decades,'12 5
and extending section 1983 to grant claims might indeed increase the
courts' caseload even further. Caseload, however, is small reason to deny
grant beneficiaries the same protection afforded other holders of federal
rights. The federal courts should not evade their duty to vindicate endan-
gered federal rights merely because their dockets are overloaded. That
failure would "implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative
importance of classes of legally protected interests." 2 The proper way to
ease the federal docket lies in proper court administration, not in discrimi-
nating among federally-protected rights.
Conclusion
Courts should give full scope to the individual rights created by Con-
gress in grant-in-aid legislation, and section 1983 should be broadly avail-
able to remedy state noncompliance with federal grant conditions. So long
as a party meets the injury-in-fact test for standing, no more demanding a
test of the plaintiff's "interest" in the enforcement of grant conditions
should be imposed. The presumption in favor of the application of section
1983 should be overcome only where a party clearly shows that Congress
intended to exclude it from a particular remedial scheme. This require-
ment might be satisfied under one of two conditions: (1) where the grant-
123. Congress has recently adopted this type of exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits brought
by state prisoners. The Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1997
(Supp. V 1981) requires that prisoners, who constitute a significant proportion of all § 1983 claim-
ants, exhaust administrative procedures if exhaustion "would be appropriate and in the interest of
justice." The Attorney General of the United States must have certified or the court itself have deter-
mined that the procedures meet certain standards specified by the statute. Id. § 1997a(b)(2). The court
must retain the case on its docket during administrative review, which may take no longer than 90
days, id. § 1997e(a)(1).
124. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
125. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 50, at 87-90; Note, supra note 9, at 1172. The size of this
possible increase is unclear. Even if the number of § 1983 grant claims could be determined, some
would presumably be brought under different legal theories, see supra p. 1004, were § 1983
unavailable.
126. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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in-aid statute expressly provides an exclusive remedy for its violation, or
(2) where the statute provides for more restricted judicial review of the
individual's claim.
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